Fabius intercepted him near Casilinum, in Campania, on the left bank of the Volturnus. The heights that commanded the right bank of the river were occupied by his main army; and the road itself, which led across the river, was guarded by a strong division of men.
Hannibal, however, ordered his light-armed troops to ascend the heights over the road during the night, driving before them oxen with burning fagots tied to their horns, giving the appearance of an army marching by torchlight. The plan was successful. The Romans abandoned the road and marched for the heights, along which they supposed the enemy were going. Hannibal, with a clear road before him, continued his march with the bulk of his army. The next morning he recalled his light-armed troops.

Early one morning in June the Romans massed their troops on the left bank of the river, with their cavalry on either wing, the right under Paullus, and the left under Varro. The Proconsul Servilius commanded the centre.
The Carthaginians were drawn up in the form of a crescent, flanked by cavalry. Both armies advanced to the attack at the same time. The onset was terrible; but though the Romans fought with a courage increased by the thought that their homes, wives, and children were at stake, they were overwhelmed on all sides. Seventy thousand fell on the field, among whom were Paullus, Servilius, many officers, and eighty men of senatorial rank. This was the most crushing defeat ever experienced by the Romans. All Southern Italy, except the Latin colonies and the Greek cities on the coast, went over to Hannibal.

Macedonia, and earnestly urged Hasdrubal Baroa, his lieutenant in Spain, to come to his assistance. He hoped, with this army from the north, with supplies and reinforcements from Carthage, and with such troops as he might obtain from Macedonia, to concentrate a large force at Rome and compel her into submission.
The Romans, realizing the position of Hannibal, kept what forces they could spare in Spain, under the two Scipio brothers, Publius and Gnaeus. With these they hoped to stop reinforcements from reaching the enemy from that quarter. At the same time their army in Northern Greece effectually engaged the attention of Philip. Thus two years (214-212) passed without any material change in the situation of affairs in Italy.

But Hannibal's superiority as a general is unquestionable, and his want of success after this was due to insufficient aid from home, and to the fact that the resources of Rome were greater than those of Carthage. The Latin allies of Rome had remained true to their allegiance, and only one city of importance was under his control. It was an easy matter to conquer the enemy in open battle, but to support his own army was more difficult, for all Italy had been devastated. On the other hand, the Romans were well supplied with food from their possessions in Sicily.
Hannibal saw, therefore, that more active measures than those already employed were necessary. He sent to Carthage an appeal for aid. He formed an alliance with Philip V.

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