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aristotelian synthesis
[ 97 ]
substance, is the act of perfection
of the body. How could the soul be a substance?
Albert answered that while the soul lacks matter, it has something analogous to
matter, which he called, rather mysteriously, what is (quod est). Not much of a
solution, it would seem. But even if it were a solution, it raised the question of
how the unity of each person can be explained. Albert answered that each of the
two substances of which people are composed have a natural dependence on the
other, by virtue of which they jointly constitute just one substance. Albert
claimed that if the soul were merely a substance and not also an “act of perfec-
tion” of the body, this would not be possible. To his own satisfaction, he was
thereby able to account for personal unity and also ensure personal immortality.
Others questioned the obvious tensions in his view. However, few of them, at the
time, were able to do much better. To his credit, Albert summed up the tensions
in his own view by remarking that “when we consider the soul according to
itself, we shall agree with Plato; but when we consider it in accordance with the
animation it gives to the body, we shall agree with Aristotle.”
6
That, it seems, is
not only the key to the tension in Albert’s view but also to the tensions in virtu-
ally everyone’s view during the thirteenth century.
Bonaventure Versus Aquinas
During the 1250s, Bonaventure (1217-1274) and Aquinas (1225-1274) became
the dominant theorists of the soul. They both sought to safeguard the immortality
of the soul while maintaining the unity of the human being, but they pursued this
goal differently. In Bonaventure’s approach, Aristotelian elements are embedded
in a predominantly Neoplatonic, mystical framework, while in Aquinas’s, Pla-
tonic elements are embedded in a predominantly Aristotelian, scientific frame-
work. Between their competing views, the thirteenth century was presented
with a clear choice.
Bonaventure, an Italian Franciscan who spent the most important part of his
career at the University of Paris, claimed that the soul, which is the form of a
human, is a substance in its own right. It can be a substance, he claimed, since
prime matter is neither corporeal nor spiritual but becomes one or the other
depending on the form with which it unites. The human soul combines with
prime matter to form a spiritual substance. Of course, the body is also a sub-
stance. What, then, of the unity of the person? Bonaventure answered that nei-
ther soul nor body is a “complete substance.” In complete, unified substances,
matter and form mutually exhaust each other’s appetite for fulfillment. How-
ever, when the soul and body are separated from each other, neither exhausts its
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