 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
|
 |
general malaise. This gave rise to a new emphasis on individualism. The Latin term
“
persona ,” from which the English term
person
derives, acquired its modern meaning
from within the context of this latter development.
Greek religious myths had earlier given way to Plato’s otherworldliness, which
then spawned increasingly secular, this-worldly perspectives in the thought of
Aristotle, the materialists, and the skeptics. Although Heraclitus had much ear-
lier said that “a man’s character is his fate,” Aristotle’s account of human nature,
as in “man is a rational animal,” tended to be generic.
1
And when Aristotle did
turn to the consideration of character, he was primarily interested in character
types . Among Roman philosophers, by contrast, a generic approach to human
nature was supplemented by consideration of individual character and what dis-
tinguishes people. In addition, an earlier focus on biology and behavior was mod-
ified to include a heightened interest in human subjectivity.
According to Cicero (106-43 b.c.e.), who was not himself a Stoic but whose
thought was pervaded by the spirit of Stoicism, although “character, for man, is
destiny,” we are invested by Nature with two characters (personae). One of these,
per the Aristotelian theory of our common human nature, we share with every
human being. However, the other distinguishes us from one another. These lat-
ter, then, vary from person to person. In Cicero’s view, what humans share with
one another are the capacity for rationality and the ability to discover their duty.
Humans are equipped by nature for these tasks. However, in our “natures and
characters,” there are “countless” differences among us. These differences, he
said, are not necessarily deviations from what is ideal in humanity but rather are
potentially good. What is important is that each person “must resolutely hold
fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious.”
As Plato and Aristotle had also done before him, Cicero drew attention to
certain intermediary social roles, such as being a wise person, that fall between the
generality of our shared human essence and the individuality of who we are as
unique people. “Propriety” occurs, he said, “when the actions and words” of an
individual are “appropriate to his role.” When such propriety is “visibly dis-
played” in the way we lead our lives, it “elicits the approval” of those who see it.
Consistency is key: “How dignified, then, how lofty, how consistent is the charac-
ter of the wise man [
persona sapientis ].”
2
But Cicero went
beyond this sort of rec-
ognition of personality types to the recognition of individual uniqueness, even to
the point of distinguishing between those of our individual characteristics that
merely particularize us from one another and those that express who we really are.
In advising people to take possession of their authentic natures, he became the
first to express the modern idea that there is such a thing as one’s
true self . Wedding
the traditional Greek ideal of realizing human excellence with a Roman, and